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TAKING EVIDENCE AND BREAKING TREATIES: 
AEROSPATIALE AND THE NEED 
FOR COMMON SENSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
jAMES G. DWYER* 
Lois A. Yurow• • 
The 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence 
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Evidence Convention or 
Convention) 1 provides procedures by which litigants in United 
States courts may obtain documents and other information 
located in foreign states that are signatories to the Convention. 
The United States Supreme Court, in its 1987 decision Societe 
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court,2 held 
that the Convention represents neither an exclusive nor a 
mandatory means of obtaining evidence from abroad. The Con-
vention, the Court ruled, imposes no restrictions on the powers 
of a trial court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed-
eral Rules) to compel discovery from foreign litigants and to 
impose sanctions for non-compliance. Rather, it simply provides 
optional procedures which a U.S. trial court may elect to employ 
after balancing the interests of the sovereign states and the liti-
gants involved in a particular case. 
This article challenges the rule of law which Aerospatiale estab-
lished as violative of U.S. obligations under the Evidence Con-
vention and likely to produce ill-reasoned trial court decisions 
disfavoring use of Convention procedures. The authors advo-
cate a rule requiring trial courts to honor requests by litigants 
that the Convention procedures be followed, while preserving 
the powers of the courts under the Federal Rules to award costs 
• Associate, Coudert Brothers, Washington, D.C.; J.D., 1987, Yale University; 
B.A., 1984, Boston College. 
•• J.D. Candidate, 1989, The George Washington University National Law Center; 
B.A., 1984, Brandeis t:niversity. 
1. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 744 [hereinafter Evidence 
Convention]. 
2. 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) [hereinafter Aerospatiale]. 
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and draw adverse inferences from insufficient compliance with 
discovery orders. Such a rule would satisfy U.S. obligations 
under the Convention, promote efficiency and fairness, and initi-
ate a new era of rational and consistent decision-making in reso-
lution of transnational disputes. 
This article begins by identifying what the Evidence Conven-
tion added to the discovery process. For this purpose, it consid-
ers how discovery would proceed in international litigation in a 
hypothetical no-Convention environment. The article then 
examines specific provisions of the Evidence Convention and 
reviews the divergent ways in which lower courts applied these 
provisions prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Aerospatiale. 
The authors propose a pragmatic contractual construction of 
the Convention which focuses on its structure and the implicit 
and explicit obligations it contains. This approach contrasts 
sharply with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Aerospatiale. The 
authors argue that the Supreme Court reached the wrong conclu-
sion in Aerospatiale because it based its analysis on two faulty 
premises: 1) that the silence of the Convention concerning its 
effect on domestic law precludes the existence of a commitment 
to use Convention procedures in the first instance, and 2) that to 
require use of Convention procedures would create inequities 
between U.S. and foreign litigants. 
Finally, this article examines the lower court opinions that have 
followed Aerospatiale and concludes that, by creating a presump-
tion against use of the Convention and leaving lower courts 
otherwise without guidance in exercising their discretion, the 
Supreme Court has fostered decisions which inadequately ana-
lyze the interests at stake in individual cases and improperly 
reject use of Convention procedures. The Aerospatiale opinion 
does not appear to be susceptible of a narrowing interpretation, 
insofar as it categorically rejects a presumption in favor of using 
the treaty. The authors therefore conclude that if the original 
objectives of the Convention are ever to be realized, it will be 
necessary either to enact corrective domestic legislation or to 
renegotiate the Convention so as to make its mandatory quality 
more explicit. 
II. INTERNATIONAL D-IscovERY IN A No-CoNVENTION 
ENVIRONMENT 
To understand the effect which the Evidence Convention 
should have on domestic U.S. law, it is helpful to consider how a 
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U.S. court would supervise discovery in transnational litigation in 
the absence of the Convention. In such a hypothetical regime, a 
U.S. district court supervising discovery of documents or testa-
mentary evidence located in a foreign state would be required to 
operate within the bounds created by generally accepted princi-
ples of international law and by other law of the United States.3 
In defining these bounds, the court would begin with the princi-
ple of state territorial sovereignty, which is fundamental to cus-
tomary ,intemationallaw.4 The Supreme Court enunciated this 
principle in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon: 
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is nec-
essarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limita-
tion not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving 
validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of 
its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an invest-
ment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power 
which couid;mpose such restrictions. 
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of 
a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the 
consent of the nation itself. 5 
The principle of territorial sovereignty both creates and limits 
the lawful powers of a nation's government, including its judici-
ary. This principle forms the basis for the authority of a U.S. 
court to fully ex~rcise its constitutional and statutory powers 
within the United States, including its power to compel defend-
ants over whom it has personal jurisdiction to comply with U.S. 
statutory procedures for litigation. 6 At the same time, the princi-
ple of territorial sovereignty precludes a U.S. court from usurp-
ing the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign state over persons, 
3. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that customary 
international law is the law of the land of the United States). 
4. See T. GnrrrARI, THE AMERICAN LAw OF SovEREIGN IMMUNITY 5 (1970). 
5. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812), ciud with approval in Verlinder B. V. v. Cen-
tral Banke of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). 
6. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may compel the 
production of documents, FED. R. Crv. P. 37, answers to interrogatories, id., admissions, 
FED. R. Crv. P. 36, and the appearance for questioning of parties and persons under the 
legal control of a party. FED. R. Crv. P. 37. The court has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
conduct of litigation. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116. 
Because the obligations rest in the United States, the parties are bound to comply fully 
or suffer the consequences, even if compliance would necessitate violation of another 
nation's law. See Societe Intemationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerci-
ales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 
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property, or activities within that state's territory.' It bars any 
assumption of jurisdiction to compel conduct in a foreign state 
without that state's permission, particularly where the conduct in 
question is prohibited by the law of the foreign state.s Thus, the 
7. In practice, the exercise of jurisdiction by American couns affects foreign per-
sons, propeny located abroad, and activities occurring abroad when a tangible link con-
nects them to the U.S. forum. For example, U.S. couns may exercise jurisdiction over 
persons who are citizens of foreign states when they have cenain "minimum contacts" 
with the forum in which the coun resides. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, !J26 
U.S. 310, 316 (1945). This jurisdictional rule is justified because such persons have 
purposely availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within that forum. 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The exercise of jurisdiction by a U.S. 
court may also affect propeny located in a foreign state to the extent that a pany 
chooses to satisfy a money judgment out of its assets located abroad. Finally, U.S. couns 
have extended their jurisdiction to cover local effects of foreign conduct when U.S. law 
prohibits those activities, so long as a foreign state has not compelled that conduct. See, 
e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) 
(holding defendants subject to liability under the Sherman Act, even though the prohib-
ited conduct occurred in Canada, because the Canadian government did not compel that 
conduct and it produced effects within the United States). The facts of the Aerospatiale 
case were the mirror image of the facts in Continental On. The district coun issued an 
order to compel conduct in the United States which required the defendant to engage in 
an activity in France which that state prohibits. See Aerospatiall, 107 S. Ct. at 2544. 
8. U.S. courts have issued injunctions to prohibit conduct abroad which has a 
domestic effect, even though the conduct was consistent with the laws of the foreign 
state where it took place. See Continental On, 370 U.S. 690. However, the principle of 
territorial sovereignty suggests that the power of a U.S. coun over foreign conduct 
should extend only as far as its authority to order payment of damages for the domestic 
effects produced by the defendant's foreign conduct, and to enforce such an award by 
exercising jurisdiction over the defendant's propeny located in the United States. See 
Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 543-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (per-
mitting U.S. imponers to recover monies erroneously paid to exponers-who seized a 
cigar business pursuant to a confiscatory decree by the Cuban government-by exercis-
ing set-off against future accounts, but not challenging the validity of the confiscation in 
Cuba),I'TIIHlifod sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rn~'d sub 
nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (agreeing 
with the district court on this issue). U.S. couns have respected the sovereignty of for-
eign states to the extent of declining to order conduct which would be inconsistent with 
the law or public policy of the state in which the conduct would occur. See United States 
v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835,871-77 (D.NJ. 1953) (ordering the defendant 
to cease anticompetitive activity affecting the United States, but declining to interfere 
with the company's other activities and operations abroad). 
U.S. couns have refrained from sitting in judgment of acts of foreign sovereigns 
within their own territories. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 
(1964). They have also refused to recognize any right of foreign states to act or compel 
conduct within the United States that would be contrary to U.S. law or public policy. See 
Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), em. denied, 382 U.S. 
1027 ( 1966) (refusing to enforce an Iraqi ordinance that would affect propeny of an 
Iraqi citizen held by a U.S. bank). For U.S. courts to claim a right to act or compel 
conduct contrary to the law of a foreign state would be inconsistent, and an unjustified 
incursion into the foreign sovereign's jurisdiction. See A. NEALE & M. STEPHENS, INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS AND NATIONALjURISDICTION 94-98 (1988). 
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authority of U.S. district courts extends to compelling or prohib-
iting behavior of litigants within the forum territory, but not to 
compelling conduct which a litigant may need to carry out in a 
foreign state prior to satisfying the court's order that certain 
behavior - such as production ·of evidence - take place in the 
forum territory. Correspondingly, the foreign state in which a 
litigant must carry out acts preparatory to compliance with dis-
covery in U.S. litigation may exercise complete dominion over 
those acts, by controlling the manner of evidence-gathering 
behavior, or even prohibiting such behavior altogether. The 
effect of the two states exercising their bona fide authority may 
be to create incompatible obligations for the requested litigant. 
By applying tbese general principles to international litigation 
occurring in a hypothetical no-Convention environment, we gain 
insight into the practical and legal effect of the Evidence Conven-
tion. Assume Party A, a U.S. citizen, makes a discovery request 
of Party B, a national of civil law Country X,9 and that the law of 
Country X prohibits private parties from gathering evidence 
within its borders for production in litigation abroad. 1o Party B 
9. This is the most common scenario in transnational litigation before U.S. couru, 
and the one which the Supreme Court considered in Aerospatiale. It is important to note, 
however, that the Evidence Convention also applies to situations in which a litigant who 
is a U.S. citizen must produce evidence located in a foreign state. Cf Evidence Conven-
tion, supra note 1, art. 15 (authorizing a diplomatic or consular officer to take evidence 
from a fellow national within the officer's station country). This situation is not uncom-
mon in light of the multinational character of many U.S. firms. 
10. Common law nations, such as the United States, permit parties to a litigation to 
conduct their own discovery - securing evidence and presenting a selected portion at 
trial. Su FED. R. CIV. P. 26. In contrast, in civil law countries, such as France, the gath-
ering of eYidence is a judicial function. The courts conduct discovery, requesting the 
parties before them to produce evidence to the court during hearings. A party does not 
request information directly from an opponent. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADJ· 
TION 111-23 (1985); Brieffor the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae at 5-7, An-ospa-
tiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695); REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION 
TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCE (April, 1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 785, 806 [hereinafter 
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION). 
Many civil law countries seek to preserve the official nature of evidence gathering by 
prohibiting private parties from removing documents and information from the country 
for production in foreign litigation. By enacting such "blocking laws," see infra note 87, 
these countries may also be striving to protect their nationals from the burdens of dis-
covery in a foreign court. Countries with blocking laws likely view them more as shields 
than as affirmative restrictions, and permit their nationals to voluntarily comply with 
foreign discovery requests. See Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. S.S. Seatrain Bennington, No. 
80 Civ. 1911 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (speculating on 
the intent of France to enforce its blocking statute). Absent such flexible application of 
their laws, these countries would be limiting the ability of their citizens to effectively 
prosecute claims in foreign courts. /d. Countries are less likely to accede to requests by 
their nationals for a waiver when the blocking law reflects a substantive and fundamental 
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objects to the U.S. court that it is legally prevented from gather-
ing the evidence and requests that the court use its discretionary 
statutory power to execute a letter rogatory (or letter of 
request) 11 seeking the assistance of Country X in gathering the 
evidence. 12 
In this hypothetical situation, the court would have two 
options. The court may refuse to execute a letter rogatory and 
simply issue an order for production.~!' If Party B fails to comply 
with this order, the court may: 1) draw inferences adverse to 
Party B with respect to any issue which the court cannot resolve 
because of Party B's failure to produce evidence, 14 2) limit or 
defer Party B's own discovery so as to put A and Bat an equal 
disadvantage, 15 or 3) award to Party A the costs which Party A 
public policy of the foreign state. Stt Societe lntemationale Pour Participations lndus-
trielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (Swiss bank unable to get 
pennission from the Swiss government to produce evidence needed to reclaim its prop-
erty that the United States seized under the Trading with the Enemy Act). 
In a properly operating legal regime, the threat of sanctions and costs for non-cooper-
ation will render this "shield" ineffectual and actually hannful to the requested party in 
U.S. litigation. The forum court will not waive a discovery order to accommodate a 
blocking law, see id., so the litigant ultimately must choose either to comply with the 
order or sustain the financial and procedural burdens that the forum court will impose. 
Therefore, it is in the best interests of the producing party to seek a waiver of a foreign 
blocking law or to comply fully with an initial discovery request when no blocking law 
exists, and to request that the court issue a letter rogatory only when the foreign state's 
law actually prevents it from gathering evidence. Thus, courts have no need to make a 
factual detennination as to what the foreign law actually proscribes or as to the likeli-
hood of its enforcement. 
II. A letter rogatory (or letter of request) is a fonnal written communication sent 
by a court where an action is pending to a court or judge in a foreign country. The letter 
requests that the foreign court fonnally take the testimony of a witness who resides 
within the jurisdiction of the foreign court, and transmit it to the requesting court for 
use in the pending action. 8 C. WRIGHT Be A. Miu.ER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocE-
DURE§ 2083 (1970). Letters rogatory are issued through diplomatic channels pursuant 
to bilateral arrangements. Letters of request are issued pursuant to treaties. RESTATE-
MENT (fHIRD) oF FOREIGN RElATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES§ 473, reporter's note 
I (1986). 
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 178l(a)(2), (b)(2) (1982) (providing that courts mJJY transmit let-
ters rogatory either directly to foreign tribunals or with the assistance of the State 
Department) (emphasis added); FED. R. C1v. P. 28(b) ("In a foreign country, depositions 
mJJY be taken . . . pursuant to a letter rogatory.") (emphasis added). 
13. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(a). 
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Cj Rogm, 357 U.S. at 207 (holding that federal 
district courts may draw adverse inferences from a foreign plaintiff's non-compliance 
with a production order, regardless of the party's good faith attempt to circumvent its 
country's blocking statute). 
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b) (the district court may allow either party a time longer 
than the nonnal 30 days to respond to a discovery request); FED. R. CIV. P. 2.6(b), (c) 
(the district court may limit the scope of either party's discovery). 
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incurs in obtaining the evidence by other means. 16 The U.S. 
court has no authority to order Party B to gather and remove 
evidence from Country X. 17 
Alternatively, the U.S. court may choose to honor Party B's 
request by delivering a letter ·rogatory to judicial officers of 
Country X. 18 If Cou_ntry X cooperates and the resulting evidence 
is sufficient, the matter ends. If this avenue of discovery requires 
more time or expense than the usual methods of gathering evi-
dence located in the United States, the court may impose this 
cost on the producing party .19 Should the evidence which the 
letter rogatory elicits prove insufficient because the laws of Coun-
try X regarding the methods or permissible scope of discovery 
are more restrictive than those of the United States,20 the U.S. 
court would have the same sanctions available to it as in a case 
where it does not employ a letter rogatory: The court may draw 
inferences adverse to Party B with respect to the issues that the 
unproduced evidence would have resolved, limit Party B's own 
discovery, or order Party B to compensate Party A for costs Party· 
A incurs in obtaining needed evidence by other means.21 
Either of these approaches would trigger adjustments in the 
behavior of both individuals and governments. At the individual 
level, Party B would exhaust every means available for compli-
ance with a discovery request - including seeking a waiver of the 
foreign state's blocking law22 - before it petitions the court to 
employ letters rogatory, in order to avoid paying for that proce-
dure or incurring sanctions for its failure to produce evidence.2s 
16. Ft;n. R. CIV. P. 37(b}(2). 
17. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781(a)(2), (b)(2) (1982). See Danisch v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 
America, 19 F.R.D. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Uebersee Finanz-Korporation v. Brownell, 121 
F. Supp. 420 (D.D.C. 1954). 
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); see Uebersee, 121 F. Supp. at 426 (requiring the foreign 
party to post security for potential costs and expenses); infra note 128. The court may 
also review the need for discovery requests to ensure that they are not designed only to 
harass the requested party. FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b)(l). 
20. In the United States, under the Federal Rules, parties can obtain any informa-
tion likely to lead to admissible evidence. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b). In contrast, courts in 
civil law countries may restrict discovery to admissible evidence. See J. MERRYMAN, supra 
note 10, at 115-19. 
21. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
22. Supra note 10. 
23. A party who is faced with choosing between inconsistent sovereign commands 
cannot justify inadequate compliance or non-production of evidence by invoking the 
defense of foreign sovereign compulsion; this doctrine protects only behavior occurring 
within the state that compels it. See A. NEALE & M. STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 94-98. 
Thus, although the requested party may be prohibited from gathering evidence in 
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Whatever the outcome, Party B - who willfully interjected itself 
into U.S. territory - would rightfully shoulder the burdens 
which U.S. law imposes by requiring compliance with discovery 
requests, and which Country X imposes by its restrictions on evi-
dence gathering. If foreign persons engaged in commerce with 
U.S. entities regarded these burdens as too great, they would 
restrict or cease their activities in the United States, or petition 
the governments of the United States and other countries where 
they operate to modify their laws and practices so as to remove 
obstacles to international discovery. If foreign persons 
threatened to restrict their activities to such a degree that U.S. 
concerns would suffer from the loss of business, the latter might 
offer more favorable contract terms, or join in petitioning the 
governments concerned for more workable international discov-
ery procedures.24 
At the government level, as a result of the petitioning of con-
cerned private parties, either the United States or the foreign 
state might unilaterally change its domestic discovery law to 
require greater cooperation with the courts of other countries. 
Sovereign states are generally unwilling to make such conces-
sions to the preferred practices of other nations without receiv-
ing some concessions in return. Consequently, the governments 
of the United States and of concerned foreign states would be 
more likely to negotiate a treaty for the taking of evidence in 
their countries by litigants before foreign courts. By creating 
reciprocal commitments and concessions, such a treaty would 
improve cooperation between countries in transnational litiga-
tion and create greater uniformity in the rules for international 
discovery. 
In the real world, prior to the 1970 Evidence Convention, U.S. 
courts frequently refused to issue letters rogatory and simply 
penalized parties for their failure to produce evidence when a 
another country, he is not excused from producing the evidence in the U.S. court. If 
litigants know that U.S. courts will exercise their full authority to order production and 
impose sanctions such that a letter rogatory and assertion of blocking statutes will not 
protect them from the requirement of full compliance, they will be discouraged from 
making unnecessary requests. 
24. The authors presume to attribute to actors in the international arena a greater 
degree of sophistication than one might attribute to persons acting only locally. We 
therefore place greater faith in the ability of the market to adjust to changes in the inter-
national legal climate than we might in a domestic context. See infra note 81. 
1988] Taking Evidence and Breaking Treaties 447 
foreign state's laws prevented them from complying with a dis-
covery request.25 The result was to leave unreconciled conflict-
ing demands on producing parties and to frustrate the needs of 
requesting parties when evidence located abroad was not forth-
coming. Some courts expressed concern for the interests of the 
foreign state involved and crafted discovery orders to minimize 
the burden on the producing party and the affront to the foreign 
sovereign.26 Those courts that did employ letters rogatory rec-
ognized that, although use of the letters was optional, it was the 
only means by which the producing litigant could legally obtain 
the requested evidence from the foreign state involved.27 On the 
whole, the practice of U.S. courts was sufficiently unsatisfactory 
that pressure mounted for negotiation of a treaty to govern the 
taking of evidence located outside a forum state, as predicted in 
the hypothetical situation above. 
Ill. THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION 
The 1968 Hague Conference on Private International Law 
launched the discussion that culminated in the Evidence Conven-
tion. 28 The United States was a key proponent of the treaty, 
because American litigants involved in actions requiring the dis-
covery of evidence located abroad had long been frustrated by 
25. See, e.g., Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerci-
ales, S.A. ~. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 
26. Set In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962) (requiring a 
bank to produce documents held by its Panamanian office only if the United States gov-
ernment could obtain a waiver of Panamanian secrecy laws on the bank's behalf). 
27. E.g., Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that wit-
nesses would prevail in their motion to quash if, in response to letters rogatory, Cana-
dian courts found that the production of the requested documents would violate 
Canadian law); United States v. Paraffin Wax, 2255 Bags, 23 F.R.D. 289, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 
1959); Danisch v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 19 F.R.D. 235, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) 
("Letters rogatory constitute the only procedure available to obtain plaintiff's testimony 
[in Poland)."); Uebersee Finanz-Korporation v. Brownell, 121 F. Supp. 420, 425-26 
(D.D.C. 1954) (granting, over the defendant's objections regarding expense and delay, 
the intervening plaintiff's motion to issue letters rogatory for depositions in Switzer-
land); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court for the County of Sacre-
mento, 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 507-08, 109 Cal. Rptr. 219, 221-22 (1973). 
28. See REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION, supra note 10, at 785. Twenty 
nations have since signed the Evidence Convention. The signatories are Argentina, Bar-
bados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 8 MARTINDALE-
HUBBELL LAw DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 15 (1988). 
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the differences in attitudes and procedures between U.S. and for· 
eign courts, especially courts of civil law countries.29 The pri· 
mary purposes identified for the Convention were to "bridge the 
gap, between different discovery procedures in civil and com· 
mon law states, and to facilitate discovery in a manner " 'tolera· 
ble' to the authorities of the State where it is taken and . . . 
'utilizable' in the forum where the action will be tried. " 5o 
The Convention provides essentially two procedures for 
obtaining evidence from a signatory state. The first is the use of 
"letters of request,, a traditional method by which the court 
hearing a case transmits to a court of the foreign state where evi-
dence is located a request for assistance in gathering that evi-
dence. 51 All signatories must comply with letters of request that 
relate to "commenced or contemplated" civil or commercial pro-
ceedings, 52 and that are specific as to the parties, the nature and 
source of evidence requested, and any preferred procedure for 
the taking of that evidence.55 Execution of the request must be 
expeditious and in the manner requested, unless that method is 
incompatible with the internal law of the requested state54 or is 
impossible to perform. 55 This commitment represents a major 
concession on the part of civil law countries, whose procedures 
for taking evidence in litigation are more restrictive than those of 
common law countries. 56 
The Convention provides that a state receiving a letter of 
request may refuse full compliance if execution of that request is 
not within the competence of the judiciary of the receiving state 
or if execution would threaten the sovereignty or security of that 
29. REPORT or THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION, supra note 10, at 804-06. 
30. /d. at 806. 
31. Evidence Convention, supra note I, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. at 2557, T.I.A.S. No. 744. 
32. /d. 
33. /d. an. 3, 23 U.S.T. at 2558, T.I.A.S. No. 744. A United States court can, for 
example, request a verbatim transcript of a deposition, even though the usual practice in 
the executing state may call for only a judicially prepared summary ofthe evidence. Sn, 
e.g., Brieffor the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae at 20, Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 
(1987) (No. 85-1695) (discussing modifications to French law to accommodate U.S.-style 
discovery). 
34. Incompatibility requires a direct conflict with the constitution or legislation of 
the state. States may not claim incompatibility merely because a requested method is 
different from the usual internal procedure of the state. REPORT or THE UNITED STATES 
DELEGATION, supra note )0, at 810. . 
35. Evidence Convention, supra note I, art. 9, 23 U.S.T. at 2561, T.I.A.S. No. 744. 
36. See supra note 10. 
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state.s7 In addition, the drafters of the Convention provided that 
states may condition ratification of, or accession to, the treaty on 
a rule that they will not execute letters of request for "pre-trial" 
discovery of documents.88 The record of Convention negotia-
tions indicates that this option was to be simply a safeguard 
against American-style "fishing expeditions," and not a means 
for civil law countries to avoid their commitments under the 
treaty.89 
The Convention also introduced a second method for 
37. Evidence Convention, supra note 1, an. 12, 23 U.S.T. at 2562-63, T.I.A.S. No. 
744. 
38. ld an. 23, 2~ U.S.T. at 2568, T.I.A.S. No. 744. "A Contracting State may at the 
time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute a Letter of 
Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known 
in Common Law Countries." Jd 
39. Use of the term "pre-trial" in article 2S generated confusion due to the absence 
of a shared understanding of the tenn. Many delegates to the Special Commission on 
the Operation of the Evidence Convention "were of the view that 'pre-trial discovery' 
meant some son of a proceeding pennitted under American law prior to the institution· 
of a lawsuit ... 'to detennine whether there might be some evidence somewhere which 
would support a lawsuit.' " REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE SPECIAL 
COMMISSION ON THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION OF 18 MARCH 1970 ON THE TAKING 
OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR CoMMERCIAL MATTERS, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1417, 
1421 (1978) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION). Delegates funher 
pointed out that the breadth of American discovery requests (e.g., "aU notes related 
to ... ") seemed abusive. ld at 1422-23. 
To date, sixteen of the twenty Convention signatories have made reservations under 
Article 23. See 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAw DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 13-26 (1988). How-
ever, many states have qualified these reservations so that requests for specific docu-
ments will be honored. ld Nine reservations are now expressed in a variation of the 
following: 
[The Contracting State] understand[s] 'Letters of Request issued for the pur-
pose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents' ... as including any Letter 
of Request which requires a person: 
(a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the Letter 
of Request relates are, or have been, in his possession, custody or power; or 
(b) to produce any documents other than particular documents specified in 
the Letter of Request as being documents appearing to the requested court to 
be, or be likely to be, in his possession, custody or powers. 
ld at 21 (reservation of the United Kingdom). This language permits the requested 
court to decide whether particular documents are relevant. Some states require only 
that the requesting court certify that the documents are in the "possession, custody or 
power" of the requested party. Set id. at 19 (reservation of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands). 
This qualification obviates the concerns expressed in Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2552, 
that civil law countries would uniformly and arbitrarily refuse to execute American dis-
covery requests. If letters rogatory enumerate the desired material with reasonable 
specificity and explain t.he relevance of the requested evidence, other nations are bound 
to assist. See Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at 8-10, Aems-
patialt, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (stating that in the period from 1980-85, 
the FRG executed 154 of the 181 letters of request it received; the balance were rejected 
as too general or premature); Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae at 24-
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obtaining evidence located in foreign states. Diplomatic or con-
sular officers of the state hearing the case may take depositions or 
receive documents in the foreign state in which they are sta-
tioned. 40 The treaty permits diplomatic or consular officers to 
take evidence from nationals of their own state,41 or from nation-
als of the state they serve, with permission from the government 
of that state.42 A related option allows the court hearing a case to 
appoint a commissioner to travel abroad and take evidence from 
parties or witnesses.48 The drafters of the Convention made 
these provisions entirely optional on the part of signatory states44 
in deference to the policy of civil law countries that evidence 
gathering is an exclusively judicial function. 45 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE CoNVENTION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 
For seventeen years following ratification of the Evidence Con-
vention by the United States, U.S. courts were unable to agree on 
whether, and under which circumstances, they were required to 
use Convention procedures for obtaining evidence located in the 
territory of another signatory state. Some courts viewed the 
Convention as the preferred means for securing evidence when 
the law of the foreign state prohibited the party producing evi-
dence from gathering and removing documents or information 
from its territory. These courts required that discovery requests 
issue pursuant to the Convention before they would execute a 
Rule 37 order compelling production.4 & 
25,Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (discussing the lenient procedures 
for obtaining discovery in France). 
40. Evidence Convention, supra note l. arts. 15-16, 18-21, 23 U.S.T. at 2564-67, 
T.I.A.S. No. 744. 
41. !d. art. 15, 23 U.S.T. at 2564, T.I.A.S. No. 744. A signatory state may neverthe· 
less require such officers to obtain permission from a designated official of that state 
before taking evidence from their fellow nationals. !d.; see REPORT OF mE UNITED 
STATES DELEGATION, supra note 10, at 816. 
42. Evidence Convention, supra note 1, art. 16, 23 U.S.T. at 2564-65, T.I.A.S. No. 
744. 
43. !d. arts. 17-21, 23 U.S.T. at 2565-67, T.I.A.S. No. 744. 
44. !d. art. 33, 23 U.S.T. at 2571, T.I.A.S. No. 744. Only two states, Argentina and 
Singapore, have completely prohibited depositions by diplomatic and consular officers. 
See 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL I...Aw DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 15-16, 20 (1988). Several other 
states have agreed to limited use of this method; they require reciprocity and refuse to 
assist with government compulsion or to allow depositions of locals. See id. at 13-26. 
45. Set supra note 10. 
46. E.g .• Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
211, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("The Hague Convention, signed by West Germany. provides 
an obvious and preferable means of obtaining evidence within that country."); Pierburg 
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. Courts deciding in favor of Convention procedures generally 
focused less on the ultimate responsibility of the litigants to pro-
duce evidence in the United States than on the interests of the 
state in which the evidence was located:" This approach sug-
gests that the interests of the foreign state limit the constitutional 
authority and obligation48 of U.S. courts to prosecute the cases 
before them. However, no court offered constitutional or statu-
tory support for such a proposition. 
Although these courts reached a result which accords with the 
spirit and intent of the Convention, their rationale for its applica-
tion was flawed. By signing the Convention, the United States 
made a commitment to other signatories to adhere to its terms. 
As with all nations, the sovereignty of the United States is com-
promised only to the extent of its willful agreement. 49 By predi-
cating their analyses upon unnecessary consideration of foreign 
state interests and the amorphous concept of "comity,"50 rather 
than focusing on these U.S. commitments, the courts obfuscated 
the issue most pertinent to a determination of when the Conven-
tion applies - interpretation of U.S. contractual obligations 
under the Convention. 
GmbH & Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 241, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 878 
( 1982) ("California courts must compel the litigants to first attempt . . . discovery in 
conformity with th[e] Convention."). 
4 7. Two arguments are common in opinions of courts that, prior to Atrospatiak, 
mandated use of the Convention or other procedures known to be acceptable to the 
requested state. The first focuses on judicial sovereignty- the notion in civil1aw coun-
tries that the gathering of evidence is solely a judicial function. Set General Electric v. 
North Star Int'l Inc., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 207, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (citations 
omitted) ("The whole point of requiring (as opposed to permitting) a litigant to seek 
discovery through the procedures established by the Hague Convention is to avoid 
infringing the judicial sovereignty of the foreign nation involved; that is the primary 
purpose of the treaty."); Pierburg, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 244-45, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 881 
("The foundation of the Convention is to avoid international friction where a domestic 
state court orders civil discovery to be conducted within the territory of a civil law nation 
that views such unilateral conduct as an intrusion upon its judicial sovereignty."); Volks-
wagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, Alameda County, 123 Cal. App. 3d 
840, 852-55, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 881-83 (1981). 
The second argument rests on comity - "the recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation .. .. " 
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). Courts advocating a comity analysis con-
tend that "courts of one sovereign state should not . . . require acts or forebearances 
within the territory, and inconsistent with the internal law, of another sovereign state 
unless a careful weighing of competing interests and alternative means makes clear that 
the order is justified." Volkswagenwerk Aktimgesellsclw.ft, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 857, 176 Cal. 
Rptr. at 884. 
48. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. 
49. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) . 
50. See supra note 47. 
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While some courts reached the right result for the wrong rea-
son, other courts did not require that Convention procedures be 
used at all. These courts concluded that adherence to the treaty 
would displace the Federal Rules51 and would engender greater 
delay and expense in litigation.52 These opinions reveal a basic 
misunderstanding of the impact of the Convention on the discov-
ery process in U.S. courts. 
The proposition that use of Convention procedures would dis-
place the Federal Rules eiToneously assumes that construing the 
Convention to require a U.S. court to comply with a litigant's 
request for assistance in obtaining evidence from a foreign signa-
tory state would preclude the court from exercising ultimate con-
trol over the discovery process. Specifically, it assumes that after 
the court employs Convention procedures, it could not issue a 
Rule 37 order for production or impose sanctions for incomplete 
discovery, as it would do in a no-Convention environment. How-
ever, neither the structure of the treaty nor its history compels 
the conclusion that Convention procedures would abrogate or 
suspend any of the Federal Rules.ss 
Some courts, concerned about the displacement of the Federal 
51. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 
788 F.2d 1408, 1410 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) ("The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, not the Hague Convention, normally govern discovery ... [in] United States 
couns even when the documents are located abroad."), vacated, 823 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 
1987); In re Anschuetz &: Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. vacated, 107 
S. Ct. 3223 (1987) (for reconsideration in light of Aerospatiale); Lasky v. Continental 
Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
52. See In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 612 ("Requiring that ... discovery be processed 
through foreign authorities would work a drastic and very costly change in the handling 
of this type oflitigation."); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503,523-24 (N.D. Ill. 
1984) (equating international judicial cooperation and the use of Convention proce-
dures with pre-litigation of discovery disputes in two different judicial systems). 
The irony of the objection as to time and expense is the implication that use of Con-
vention procedures actually contravenes the treaty's underlying goal. In Societe Nationale, 
the court noted that the purpose of the Convention is to facilitate discovery and make 
needed information more accessible to litigants, but implied that because the Federal 
Rules permit access to more information more expeditiously than the Convention, they 
provide the preferable procedures. 788 F.2d at 1411. Su also In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 
606 ("We believe that requiring domestic litigants to resort to the Hague Convention to 
compel discovery ... encourages the concealment of information . .. a result directly 
antithetical to the express goals of the Federal Rules and the Hague Convention."). 
53. The Convention procedures in no way conflict with the Federal Rules. After 
unsuccessfully assisting a party to obtain evidence from one foreign source which that 
party has identified, a court need not refrain from ordering the party to produce the 
evidence by any other means possible, and from using sanctions to enforce that order. 
See Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 60 (E.D. Pa. 
1983); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 211. 
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Rules, pointed out correctly that they have no duty to modify 
their procedures for litigants who must produce evidence in the 
United States and who encounter difficulty in gathering that evi-
dence.54 However, many of these courts wrongly concluded 
from that fact that the Convention has no application to the pro-
duction of evidence by a party subject to the in personam juris-
diction of the court. 55 In fact, several advanced the theory that 
the Convention governs only the taking of evidence from foreign 
non-party witnesses who are beyond the jurisdiction of the forum 
court and who are willing to be deposed only at home, or are not 
willing to be deposed at all.56 However, the fact that a state has 
212-14 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that discovery should proceed pursuant to the Conven-
tion, but that the court would use available sanctions if compliance with discovery orders 
was incomplete); infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
Several courts that declined to utilize Convention procedures argued that to do so and 
to then order production, pursuant to Rule 37, of any remaining evidence would consti-
tute a great insult to the receiving state. E.g., Graco, I 0 I F.R.D. at 525. As Justice Ste-
vens rightly pointed out in his Aerospatiale opinion, there is no reason to think that the_ 
other signatories believed the United States was relinquishing its ultimate control over 
litigation in its courts. See 107 S. Ct. at 2555-55. 
54. See, e.g., Societe Nationale, 188 F.2d at 1411; In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 611; 
Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. S.S. Seatrain Bennington, No. 80 Civ. 1911 (S.D.N.Y. May SO, 
1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). These courts reason that since "preparatory 
acts" such as selecting deponents and documents do not require the participation (in the 
form of oath-taking or compulsion) of a foreign judicial entity, or the presence of an 
adverse party on foreign soil, they do not intrude on judicial sovereignty or custom. 
However, this argument refutes a non-issue. Regardless of whether preparatory acts in 
another country intrude on that nation's judicial sovereignty, U.S. courts have no juris· 
diction to compel such acts. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
Nevertheless, it is true that United States' courts need not alter their discovery orders 
to accommodate foreign laws. Fairness and expedience dictate that courts place on the 
requested litigant the burden of exhausting all possible sources and means of collecting 
the requested evidence, rather than having courts entertain proofs that one foreign 
state's blocking laws foreclose all possibilities for the litigant to comply with discovery 
orders. 
55. In rt Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 615 ("The Hague Convention has no application at 
all to the production of evidence in this country by a party subject to the jurisdiction of a 
district court .... "); Lasky, 569 F. Supp. at 1228. See also Rich v. KIS California, Inc., 
121 F.R.D. 254, 258-60 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (holding that the Federal Rules and not the 
Evidence Convention are appropriately used for discovery to determine whether the 
foreign party is subject to the court's jurisdiction). 
56. Seeln reAnschuetz., 754 F.2d at 615; Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 520. The Eighth Circuit 
in Aerospatillle agreed with this analysis, In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 
782 F.2d 120, 125 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987), but the Supreme 
Court expressly rejected it, holding that "the Convention draws no distinction between 
evidence obtained from third parties and that obtained from the litigants themselves 
.... " 107 S. Ct. at 2554. The United States government rejects this interpretation as 
well. See Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as 
Amicus Curiae at 9-10, Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 ( 1987) (No. 85-1695) ("Neither the 
United States nor foreign signatories to the Convention have ever subscribed to the 
interpretation adopted by the court below."). 
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absolute authority over matters within its territory does not pre-
clude the possibility that the United States chose to bind itself by 
international agreement to act in a way that it would not other-
wise be required to, in order to make it easier for both foreign 
and U.S. nationals to comply with its sovereign commands.57 
While U.S. courts had no constitutional or statutory obligation 
prior to 1970 to employ letters of request at the behest of parties 
before them,58 the Hague Evidence Convention did create such 
an obligation. s9 
The objection of some courts that Convention procedures 
would add time and expense to litigation ignores a court's 
authority, undiminished by the Convention, to allocate costs in 
an equitable fashion.60 The objection presumes that when for-
eign state law actually prevents a party from gathering and 
removing evidence from that state, there are other means by 
which the requesting party can obtain such evidence. However, 
even in a no-Convention environment, courts would find it nec-
essary to use letters rogatory to enable litigants to lawfully com-
ply with requests for evidence located in such countries. 61 In 
such a case, the only alternative to letters rogatory and the addi-
tional methods provided by the Convention is non-production 
and the imposition of sanctions against the producing party, 
including the drawing of adverse inferences from the lack of evi-
dence.62 While a requesting party may prefer to win by default 
57. The drafting history of the Convention indicates that the contracting states 
clearly intended to address discovery from parties and non-parties alike. SN Brief for 
the Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Association as Amicus Curiae at 14, AerospatilJie, 107 
S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (citations omitted) (noting that the drafters of the 
Convention considered specifying the treaty's applicability to "witnesses, parties or 
experts" and deemed the language superfluous); Brief for Petitioners at 18-19, Aerospa-
tiak, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (citations omitted) (noting that if the parties 
intended for jurisdiction to control the scope of the Convention, that would have been 
mentioned in the document or its negotiation history, and the civil law countries would 
not have amended their civil codes to facilitate compliance); Brief for the Republic of 
France as Amicus Curiae at 18, Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (noting 
that the drafters of the Convention would not fail to address one of the principal sources 
of conRict in transnational litigation - that of discovery from the parties). 
58. SN supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
59. See infra text accompanying notes 63-82. 
60. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(f). As discussed above, persons operating in international 
commerce can account for the potential costs of litigation when ordering their private 
affairs. They can refrain from dealings with U.S. citizens, petition their own and the U.S. 
government for changes in the rules under which they must operate, or continue to 
trade with the United States, knowing the risks involved, and bargain for contracts which 
protect their interests. Supra note I 0; notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
61. SN supra notes 3-27 and accompanying text; infra note 98. 
62. Stt supra notes 3-27 and accompanying text. 
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rather than to litigate the case, this outcome conflicts with values 
of due process and accurate decision-making, as well as the 
United States' contractual obligations under the Convention, all 
of which far outweigh such a preference. 
v. A COMMON SENSE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE EVIDENCE CONVENTION65 
The Evidence Convention does not by its terms express what 
effect it is to have on the domestic laws of the signatory states. 
This is appropriate in light of the variety of domestic rules that 
exist among the signatory nations. The record of the Convention 
negotiations is .also silent on this issue.64 Nevertheless, the Con-
vention contains reciprocal commitments which by their nature 
indicate what relationship the treaty bears to the domestic law of 
each state. As discussed below, a contractual interpretation of 
these tenns65 reveals that the United States made commitments 
concerning its role as a state issuing letters of request. In the 
United States, these treaty commitments are the law of the 
land.66 
When nations receive requests to assist in the taking of evi-
dence for litigation in another country, the Convention commit-
ments are clear: all signatory nations must comply with properly 
6!J. "[T]he construction of a contract as to its operation and effect will, after all, 
depend less on artificial rules than on the application of good sense and sound equity to 
the object and spirit of the contract in the given case." 17 AM. juR. 2o Contracts § 243 
(1964). 
· 64. Several courts have pointed to language in the reports of the U.S. delegation to 
the drafting conference to the effect that the Convention requires no change in U.S. law 
or practice. In re Anschuetz 8c Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 610 n.l9 (5th Cir. 1985); 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984). However, this language appears in the context of discussions about the obliga-
tions of receiving states, not sending states, and refers to the already generous provisions 
in U.S. law for cooperation with requests from foreign courts for assistance with discov-
ery in cases before them. One of the United States delegates to the conference stated: 
the very liberal and open practice in the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 
[Assistance for foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such 
tribunals], under § !J.02 of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure 
Act [Assistance to Tribunals and Litigants Outside the State], and under the 
practice of most of the fifty States, means that the convention requires minimal 
internal changes in United States practice, while at the same time it will greatly 
enlarge the assistance given to United States courts and litigants in many other 
states. 
Amram, RqxJrt on the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International lAw, 63 
AM. j. INT'L l. 521, 526 (1969). 
65. "A treaty is in the nature of a contract between nations." Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243. 253 (1984). 
66. U.S. CoNST. art. VI. 
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executed letters of request except under very limited circum-
stances.67 This commitment did not constitute consideration in 
the contractual sense on the part of the United States. Since 
1964, U.S. law has permitted private parties in foreign litigation 
to gather evidence independently in the United States or to 
solicit personally the assistance of a U.S. court when compulsion 
of persons in the United States is necessary.68 Accordingly, for-
eign courts rarely have reason to transmit letters of request to 
U.S. courts. Rather, these provisions constitute the considera-
tion given by those signatories whose laws prohibit litigants 
before foreign courts from culling evidence within their territory, 
who were previously unwilling to comply with discovery requests 
from foreign courts, or who characteristically objected to the 
type of discovery that the Convention permits. 69 
To identify the commitments and consideration that the 
United States tendered in this arrangement, it is therefore neces-
sary to determine what the Convention might add to litigation in 
the United States, when the United States is the state issuing, 
rather than receiving a letter of request. The focus should be on 
the beneficiaries of the treaty and the manner in which each 
nation's concessions serve their particular needs. 
The only actor in the litigation who benefits directly from the 
Convention is the party asked to produce evidence that lies in a 
67. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. 
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982). In addition, there is no evidence in the Convention 
history that any signatory nation had difficulty in securing the cooperation of U.S. courts 
with letters of request when help was needed. U.S. courts may not deny a request for 
assistance from a foreign tribunal or litigant because of a lack of reciprocity on the pan 
of the foreign state. John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985). 
One could argue that the United States' consideration was a promise not to modify its 
generous law and practice. In a contract between private parties, one party's agreement 
not to amend its practices in the futur~ might serve as consideration for another's prom-
ise. Set 17 AM. juR. 2D Contracts § 124 (1964). This is not possible in a treaty context: 
Absent a constitutional amendment, the President and Senate may not bind the United 
States to refrain from passing legislation that is inconsistent with a treaty. In any case, 
there is no evidence that any signatory to the Convention was concerned that the United 
States might reverse its practice. 
69. These countries have, since ratifying the Convention, modified their internal 
laws to effectuate their obligations under it. For example, France amended its code of 
civil procedure to add provisions that "radically depart from traditional French rules by 
opening the Republic of Frances's borders to United States-style discovery." Brief for 
the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae at 19, Atrospatiak, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 
85-1695). These provisions permit, inltr alia, a full transcript of depositions rather than 
the standard civil law summary. and direct and cross examination by the parties' attor-
neys rather than a judge. /d. at 18-27; stt supra note I 0. 
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foreign country which has an effective blocking statute.70 As dis-
cussed earlier, the failure of a party to comply with discovery in 
no way infringes on the sovereign authority of the U.S. court 
itself; it has the power simply to sanction the party for its non-
compliance.71 The Convention, therefore, does not protect any 
sovereign interest of the United States. Nor does the Convention 
protect or assist a party making discovery demands of its adver-
sary in a U.S. court, as the court has ample authority to do that 
without Convention procedures.72 Finally, the Convention pro-
vides no direct benefit to a foreign state in whose territory 
requested evidence lies; fundamental principles of international 
law7s already protect the territorial sovereignty of that state and 
U.S. courts have never had authority to threaten it.74 
How, specifically, does the requested party benefit from the 
70. The state of which this party is a national does benefit indirectly from its citi-
zen's greater success in U.S. litigation, and the state which is the situs of the evidence 
benefits from not having to prosecute the producing party for violation of its blocking 
law. In addition, all affected states benefit indirectly by the removal of obstacles to trade 
and by the ability of U.S. courts to make more accurate and equitable judgments in 
transnational litigation. But the immediate beneficiary of the Convention is clearly the 
producing party, for whom the Convention mitigates the hardship of satisfying the 
incompatible demands of two sovereign nations. 
71. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
72. See supra text accompanying notes 60, 62. The. one area in which the Conven-
tion might directly assist a requesting party is in the taking of testimony from a witness 
who is neither a party nor under the legal control of a party, and who prefers to be 
deposed in his or her own country or refuses to testify at all. Such persons are not 
subject to compulsion by the district court, and thus can only be reached by the Conven-
tion if they will not voluntarily enter the forum. Some courts, before the Aerospatiale 
decision, concluded that the Convention only applies to the taking of evidence from 
such recalcitrant third party witnesses. See supra note 56. This interpretation would 
render the Convention completely one-sided, incorporating commitments only by the 
civil law signatories, since procedures were already in place in the United States to assist 
parties before foreign courts in the taking of such depositions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 
(1982). The language of the Convention and its history make clear that the Convention 
applies to the taking of all types of evidence in a foreign state. See Evidence Convention, 
rupra note I, art. 3(0, (g) (providing for examination of persons and inspection of docu-
ments and real and personal property); supra note 56. 
73. E.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 
(1812). 
74. To understand this point, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction 
between gathering and producing evidence. The sovereignty of a foreign state does not 
~xtend to control of litigation in the United States - the production of evidence--just 
is the sovereignty of the United States does not extend to activities abroad which are 
incident to that litigation - the gathering of evidence. See id. While the gathering of 
~vidence abroad may offend the sovereignty of a foreign state, it is not the U.S. court 
:hat causes that offense, but the producing party who must take action abroad to comply 
Nith a production order. 
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Convention? U.S. law already made use ofletters of request per-
missive by U.S. courts.75 The requested party benefits by the 
commitment of the receiving state to comply with letters of 
request but, as stated above,76 this commitment was the consider-
ation given by countries other than the United States - the civil 
law countries in particular. These countries could have obligated 
themselves unilaterally to assist U.S. courts,77 or signed a treaty 
only among themselves, if the United States had offered nothing 
in return for this commitment. Similarly, the provision allowing 
diplomatic officials or court-appointed commissioners to take evi-
dence in their territory was a unilateral concession on the part of 
signatory nations other than the United States; U.S. law already 
pennitted such-evidence-gathering procedures. 78 
Therefore, the only possible commitment which the United 
States brought to the Convention, and the one that courts must 
ascribe to it, 79 was to require its courts to honor the requests of 
parties before them to employ the Convention procedures to 
assist the parties in complying with discovery requests.80 A con-· 
elusion that the United States made a greater commitment to 
75. 28 u.s.c. § 1781 (1982). 
76. Supra text accompanying note 69. 
77. The United States in 1964 made such a unilateral offer of broad judicial assist· 
ance in the taking of evidence in the United States for foreign judicial proceedings. 5« 
Act of Oct.!, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 8(a), 78 Stat. 996 (1964} (codified at28 U.S.C. 
§ 1781 (1982)). 
78. 5« 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982) (district courts may order persons within their 
jurisdiction to provide testimonial or documentary evidence requested for use in a for-
eign proceeding). 
79. Where ... a contract ... is susceptible of two constructions, one of which 
makes. it fair. customary, and such as prudent men would naturally execute, 
while the other makes it inequitable, unusual, or such as reasonable men would 
not be likely to enter into, the interpretation which makes a fair, rational, and 
probable contract must be preferred. 
17 AM. juR. 2o Contracts § 252 (1964) (footnote omitted). "It is necessary to consider 
the situation of the panies at that time, the necessities for which they naturally provided, 
the advantages each probably sought to secure." Pritchard v. Wick, 178 A.2d 725, 727 
(Pa. 1962). 
80. [l)f the convention does not restrict unilateral extraterritorial discovery 
methods, then the civil law countries received no meaningful quid pro quo for 
their concessions to the United States . . . . While there is no requirement of 
"consideration" in international treaty law, unilateral concession is not the 
most pr~bable explanation for the behavior of governments in international 
negouauons. 
Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidmct Abroad: The 
Impact oftk Hogue Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733, 760-61 (1983). Su Brief 
for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae at ll-l2,Aerospahah, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) 
(No. 85-1695). 
Naturally, this obligation does not arise until the producing party demonstrates that 
the requested evidence is, in fact, located in a foreign state. U.S. courts might also 
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prohibit its courts from issuing orders and imposing sanctions 
under the Federal Rules after exhausting Convention procedures 
- i.e., to make the Convention exclusive - would be nonsensi-
cal. Trial court judges are neither required nor able to deter-
mine conclusively all potential sources of evidence. Therefore, 
even after tapping one source identified by the producing party 
by directing a request under the Convention to a foreign state, 
the court must continue to place the burden on the producing 
party to locate and produce requested evidence by whatever 
means possible. The court must also retain the authority to sanc-
tion a party who does not satisfy this obligation.81 
Thus, a common sense look at the language and history of the 
Convention- what it adds to a no-Convention regime, and what 
commitments it embodies in the context of an international con-
tractual arrangement - compels the conclusion that U.S. law 
requires U.S. courts to employ Convention procedures to assist a 
party who requests use of those procedures to comply with a dis-
covery request. Invocation of the Convention procedures does 
not detract from the requested party's ultimate obligation to pro-
duce all properly requested evidence; nor does it affect the 
court's authority under the Federal Rules to order full compli-
ance with the initial discovery request and to draw adverse infer-
ences from, and assess costs occasioned by, any whole or pa~tial 
noncompliance with this order.s2 
require, consistent with the purposes of the Convention, that the producing party 
demonstrate that the law of the foreign state, at least on its face, prohibits it from gath-
ering the requested evidence on its own as it would in the United States. Imposing the 
costs of the Convention procedures on the requested party and holding that party ulti-
mately responsible for full production of requested evidence will be sufficient disincen-
tive to invocation of the Convention when it is not necessary. 
8I. For this same reason, the courts are not obligated to initiate Convention proce-
dures absent a request from the producing party. Further, and consistent with the 
notion of holding a party ultimately responsible for the production of evidence which it 
controls and of which it has the best knowledge, courts should impose sanctions on a 
producing party who does not satisfactorily comply with a discovery order regardless of 
that party's good faith or bad faith in attempting to comply. See Societe Intemationale 
Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. I97, 213 
(1958) (district court is justified in drawing adverse inferences from gaps in plaintiff's 
evidence even though the plaintiff made a good faith attempt to produce all requested 
documents). The courts may justifiably attribute to actors in the international arena a 
level of sophistication sufficiently high that they may be said to have knowingly assumed 
the risk of litigation and the costs such litigation would entail. Again, a uniform rule will 
permit these actors to adjust their behavior in the direction of greater efficiency and 
rationality. 
82. The Convention limits the scope of discovery to evidence "intended for use in 
judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated." Evidence Convention, supra note 
I, art. I. Many of the signatory nations have registered reservations under Article 23 
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VI. THE AEROSPATIALE DECISION 
In 1986,88 the Supreme Court accepted the task of defining 
conclusively the circumstances in which U.S. courts must adhere 
to the Evidence Convention in domestic litigation. The Court's 
putative goal was to introduce uniformity and predictability into 
decisions regarding the taking of evidence abroad. However, the 
Court failed in this task, and instead established a rule oflaw that 
conflicts with U.S. obligations under the Convention. The deci-
sion requires U.S. trial courts to reassess in each case the very 
state interests which the Hague Conference negotiators fully con-
sidered and carefully balanced in drafting the Evidence 
Convention. 
The Aerospatiale case involved a personal injury claim by three 
American citizens ag(linst Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospa-
tiale (Aerospatiale) and another French corporation in a U.S. dis-
trict court in Iowa.84 The plaintiffs sought damages for injuries 
arising out of the crash in Iowa of an airplane that the French· 
companies had designed, manufactured, and sold. The Ameri-
can plaintiffs pursued discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Aerospatiale, an enterprise owned by the French 
government, requested an order that would limit the plaintiffs to 
use of Convention discovery · procedures to collect evidence 
located in France.85 The French defendants argued that the Con-
vention provided the exclusive means for obtaining evidence 
abroad86 because a French criminal law, a so-called "blocking 
regarding requests for pre-trial discovery. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
Therefore, the evidence produced by Convention procedures may sometimes be less 
than that·requested by U.S. litigants, as U.S. law permits panies to request any evidence, 
whether it will prove admissible or not, which "appears reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence." FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(l). A judge may have diffi-
culty determining the incremental damage done by a failure to produce evidence which 
would not be used in the proceeding but which might have led to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence. However, this problem is not created by the Evidence Convention, but 
rather, would exist even in a no-Convention environment. See supra note 20 (comparing 
the scope of discovery that civil and common law states permit). The Convention may 
even expand the scope of discovery which receiving states are willing to allow. Cf. Brief 
for the Republic ofFrance as Amicus Curiae at 18-22,AtrOSpaliale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) 
(No. 85-1695) (noting the liberalizing changes that the French government made in dis-
covery procedures after ratification of the Convention). 
83. Inn Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.), cert. 
granted, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986). 
84. Jones v. Societe Nationale lndustrielle Aerospatiale, Civ. No. 82-453-C (S.D. 
Iowajuly 31, 1985). 
85. Aeropatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546. 
86. /d. 
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statute," precluded them from complying with any discovery 
request not made in accordance with the treaty.s7 The magistrate 
denied the order.88 Aerospatiale appealed unsuccessfully to the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,89 and then sought relief 
from the Supreme Court. 
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the cir-
cuit court ruling.90 The Court held that the Convention is a 
"permissive supplement," rather than a "pre-emptive replace-
ment," for other means of obtaining evidence located abroad.91 
The Court directed district courts to decide on a case-by-case 
basis whether Convention procedures are appropriate, just as 
they would decide any other discovery issue.92 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Stevens admonished trial courts, in the interest 
of comity, to "exercise special vigilance to protect foreign liti-
gants from ... unnecessary ... or unduly burdensome discov-
ery•• and to "demonstrate due respect, for the problems of 
foreign litigants and the concerns of their countries.95 District 
courts should decide whether to use the Convention procedures 
by conducting a "particularized analysis of the respective inter-
ests of the foreign nation and the requesting nation, and should 
87. C. PEN. 80-538, art. 1A., reprinted in Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546 n .6. This 
section of the French Penal Code provides: 
Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws and regula-
tions, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose, in writing, orally 
or otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical docu-
ments or information leading to the constitution of evidence with a view to 
foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or in connection therewith. 
France is not alone in promulgating a "blocking statute" that prohibits the gathering 
of evidence for use in foreign judicial proceedings. States having such laws intend them 
to advance one or more of the following purposes: 1) to protect the state's legitimate 
interests in non-disclosure, 2) to attract questionable but lucrative business enterprises 
in need of secrecy, and 3) to limit the reach of American investigations into foreign 
economic activity. Rosdeitcher, Foreign Blocking Statutes and United States Discovery: A Con-
flict of National Policies, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 1061, 1063-65 (1983). France 
promulgated its blocking statute primarily for the third purpose. Toms, The Frmch 
Response to Extraterritorilll Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 15 INT'L LAw. 585, 586 
(1981). 
88. See 107 S. Ct. at 2544. 
89. In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986), 
vacated, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987). The court of appeals held that the Convention applies 
only to the taking of depositions from non-parties in a foreign state, and not to the 
production of evidence by persons over whom the district court has jurisdiction. /d. at 
125. The Supreme Court, while affirming the Eighth Circuit's ruling, summarily 
rejected this finding. 107 S. Ct. at 2554. 
90. 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987). 
91. /d. at 2551. 
92. See id. at 2557. 
93. Id. 
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assess the "likelihood that resort to [the] procedures will prove 
effective. " 94 Justice Stevens cited the existence of a blocking law 
as one factor to consider in this analysis, because a blocking stat-
ute is indicative of the sovereign interests of the foreign state.95 
Nevertheless, the opinion made clear that courts should not 
accord dispositive weight to these statutes.96 The majority pro-
vided no further guidance with respect to the method district 
courts should use to perform this comity analysis. 
An examination of Justice Stevens• majority opinion from the 
perspective of our common sense understanding of the Conven-
tion•s place in domestic law reveals that the opinion is both ana-
lytically and practically unsound. Justice Blackmun, in his 
94. /d. at 2555~56. The Couit noted that the drafters of the Restatement of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States approved this type of analysis. /d. at 2556. That 
body recommends that an American court consider five factors when issuing an order 
for discovery from abroad: 
[ 1) the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or 
other information requested; [2] the degree of specificity of the request; [!] 
whether the information originated in the United States; [4) the availability of 
alternative means of securing the information; and [5] the extent to which non-
compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the 
United States, or compliance ... would undermine important int.erests of the 
state where the information is located. 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (REvtSED) § 437(l)(c) 
(Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986) (approved May 14, 1986) (current version at RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 442(1)(c) (1986)). How-
ever, in adopting the test suggested by the American Law Institute, the Court omitted 
any mention of the prerequisite for reaching the test at all; specifically it failed to men-
tion that requests for discovery from abroad should come through court order, not pri-
vate parties as permitted in usual domestic litigation. Courts should only issue such 
orders after careful scrutiny of the party's request to ensure that the information sought 
is "directly relevant and material." It is at this stage that the comity analysis is triggered. 
!d. comment a and reporter's note 2. Moreover, the fourth element of the test, regard· 
ing alternative means, contemplates that a court will consider resorting to the Evidence 
Convention procedures before issuing an order under the Federal Rules. See RESTATE-
MENT OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (REvtSED) § 473 (Tent. Draft 
No.6, 1985) (approved Apr. 12, 1985), reporter's note 6 (current version at RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 473, reporter's note 6 
(1986)). 
95. 107 S. Ct. at 2556, n.29. 
96. /d. Indeed, the Court bristled at the "extraordinary exercise of legislative juris-
diction" by France over U.S. judges which the broad language of the French statute 
implies. /d. It is true that the French blocking statute appears to reach activity which will 
take place both within and outside France by prohibiting requests for evidence as well as 
the gathering of such evidence. See supra note 87. However, that blocking statute also 
reinforces France's commitment to the Convention; "[t]he French statute's prohibitions 
are expressly 'subject to' international agreements and applicable laws and it does not 
affect the taking of evidence under the Convention." 107 S. Ct. at 2566 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting in part). 
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dissent, identified some of the practical weaknesses of the major-
ity opinion. However, while the dissent accurately predicted the 
quagmire of inconsistent discovery rulings into which the major-
ity's opinion would plunge U.S. district courts, it does not ade-
quately address the opinion's analytical shortcomings. 
The bulk of the majority opinion is directed toward refuting 
the contention that the Convention is the "exclusive" means for 
obtaining evidence abroad in cases where the party obligated to 
produce evidence confronts a foreign blocking law. Both the 
majority opinion and the argument it purports to refute interpret 
''exclusivity'' to mean the displacement of procedures available 
under the Federal Rules for obtaining evidence located abroad.97 
However, this interpretation is illogical. The Evidence Conven-
tion contains the only procedures available for extracting evi-
dence from a foreign signatory state which prohibits the 
requested party from removing the evidence itself; there are no 
other procedures for it to pre-empt.98 The only proper question, 
then, is whether the Convention procedures are mandatory. 
Must signatories to the Convention use the Convention proce-
dures to assist parties before their courts who are faced with such 
a conflict, or may they instead leave litigants to their own devices 
and simply punish them for the inadequacy of their efforts? 
In considering whether the Convention procedures are 
mandatory, the Court first observed that the Preamble to the 
Convention states as its purposes facilitating the transmission 
and execution of letters of request and improving mutual judicial 
cooperation,99 but concluded from the absence of any mandatory 
terms that adherence to the Convention is qot required. 100 How-
ever, the absence of an explicit statement that the contracting 
97. See id. at 2550 ("The Hague Convention might be read as requiring its use to 
the exclusion of any other discovery procedures whenever evidence located abroad is 
sought for use in an American coun. "). 
98. Absent the Convention, requested parties in that situation could retrieve evi-
dence from abroad only pursuant to letters rogatory. See supra notes 3-27, 61-62 and 
accompanying text. The Convention incorporates this procedure and adds to it the 
option of taking evidence through diplomatic or consular officers, or commissioners. See 
supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text. See also supra note 53 ~nd accompanying text 
(noting that the Evidence Convention does not pre-empt the Federal Rules). 
99. Evidence Convention, supra note I, Preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 2557, T.I.A.S. No. 
744. 
I 00. 107 S. Ct. at 2550 n.l5. The Court compared the Evidence Convention to the 
Multilateral Convention on the Service Abroad of judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, 
entered into force, February 10, 1969,20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 [hereinafter Service 
Convention]. The former provides that "a Contracting State may . __ request the com-
petent authority of another Contracting State ... to obtain evidence, or to perform 
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states must inst~ct their courts to honor all proper101 requests 
by litigants that Convention procedures be used certainly does 
not preclude the possibility that the signatories agreed to do just 
that. 102 
The majority also concluded from the absence of any explicit 
language to the contrary, that "the Evidence Convention itself 
does not modify the law of any contracting State . . . or compel 
any contracting State to change its own evidence-gathering pro-
cedures." 105 This conclusion is unwarranted. The Convention is 
necessarily silent regarding the effect it will have on the laws of 
each nation. Treaty implementation is a matter of domestic law 
for each signatory, 104 and the laws. of each signatory will mesh 
uniquely with an international agreement. For civil law states, 
the Convention clearly does modify law and procedures, insofar 
as these states are now required to comply with letters of request 
and to use the -procedures that the sending state directs. 105 This 
raises the question, left unanswered by the majority, as to what 
consideration the United States gave to the civil law countries in 
return for their agreement to modify their law and practices. 
Justice Stevens drew similarly unsupportable conclusions from 
the permissive language that precedes the enumeration of each 
of the Convention procedures. 106 The Court failed to consider 
that if more than one set of discovery procedures is available 
under the Convention, it would be illogical to use mandatory lan-
guage for any one of them. The fact that a requesting state may 
use letters rogatory or may use a consul or commissioner for tak-
ing evidence in a signatory state under the Convention does not 
some other judicial act." Evidence Convention, supra note I, art. I. In contrast, the 
Service Convention mandates that "the present Convention slw.ll apply in all cases, in civil 
or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial 
document for service abroad." Service Convention, supra, art. I, 20 U.S.T. at ~62, 
T.I.A.S. No. 66~8. at 2 (emphasis added). 
101. See supra note 80 (noting that parties should demonstrate that the evidence is in 
another state and that the state has an effective blocking statute before Convention-
based requests should issue). 
102. "Intention or meaning in a contract may be manifested or conveyed either 
expressly or impliedly, and it is fundamental that that which is plainly or necessarily 
implied in the language of a contract is as much a pan of it as that which is expressed." 
17 AM.juR. 2n Contracts§ 255 (1964) (citations omitted). 
10~. 107 S. Ct. at 2550-51. 
104. See generally UNITED NATIONS, REVIEW OF THE MuLTILATERAL TREATI-MAxlNG 
PRocEss 36, 148-49 (1985) (noting that, following agreement on the text of a treaty, 
each state must take domestic action to bind itselO; A. McNAIR, LAw OF TREATIES 58-77 
(1961) (discussing the authority that various states grant to their treaty negotiators). 
105. See supra notes S 1-~9. 69 and accompanying text. 
106. See 107 S. Ct. at 2551. 
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preclude the inference that a forum state must select one of these 
options. 107 Once again, a common sense contractual interpreta-
tion of the treaty reveals the degree to which Convention proce-
dures are "mandatory." By identifying the consideration each 
signatory gave and by understanding how the document affects 
their behavior, one can determine the effect that the treaty has on 
U.S. law. The majority neglected to undertake such an analysis. 
In a footnote, Justice Stevens asserted that the current position 
of the executive branch on this issue supported the Court's inter-
pretation of the Convention procedures as nonmandatory .108 
However, the government's view suffered from the same errone-
ous assumption as that of the majority - that there are proce-
dures other than those contained in the Convention "by which 
American plaintiffs might obtain foreign evidence" when, as in 
the Aerospatiale case, the law of a foreign state prevents the 
requested party from complying with a discovery order. 1o9 Even 
if the administration's views were well-founded, the interpreta-
tions that the executive branch accords to a treaty from year to 
year 110 are irrelevant to a court's determination of treaty obliga-
tions. General principles of contract law dictate that where an 
obligation arises by necessary implication from the stated terms 
of the contract, it is binding on the parties in the same way that 
explicit promises are binding, and must be interpreted in light of 
the overall structure and purpose of the contract and the under-
standing of the parties at the time of its execution. 111 A party 
cannot unilaterally amend its obligations by announcing a new 
· and different interpretation of the contract terms. 
107. Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "may" as "[d]iscretionary in its grammatical 
sense but subject to construction as mandatory where the sense of the entire context 
impels such construction." BALLENTINE's LAw DICTIONARY 785 (3d ed. 1969). State 
courts have construed the word "may" as mandatory where a permissive construction 
would render a contract without consideration on the part of one party, and therefore 
nugatory. See, e.g., Girard Trust Bank v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 364 A.2d 495, 
498-99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). 
108. See 107 S. Ct. at 2551 n.l9. 
109. /d. (quoting Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission as Amicus Curiae at 9). 
110. In 1983, the Justice Department submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme 
Court in which it took an opposite position - that the Convention "must be interpreted 
to preclude an evidence taking proceeding in the territory of a foreign state party if the 
Convention does not authorize it and the host country does not otherwise permit it." 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. 
Falzon. 464 U.S. 811 (1983) (No. 82-1888) , repnnted in 23 I.L.M. 412. 415 (1983) , appeal 
dismisud. 465 U.S. 1014 (1984). 
Ill. 17 AM. juR. 2o Contracts § 255 ( 1964). 
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Justice Stevens found further support for his conclusions in 
Article 23 of the Convention,112 which allows a contracting state 
to declare that it will not execute any letter of request for the 
purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery. He believed it incon-
ceivable that the common law signatories would agree to cede 
their courts' broad powers of discovery when other signatories 
would be entitled to prohibit the taking of pre-trial evidence. 113 
However, by committing its courts to use Convention procedures 
to assist litigants in complying with discovery requests, a nation 
does not waive its authority to control litigation. Its courts retain 
their power to order further production and to impose costs and 
other sanctions for non-compliance. 114 Correspondingly, the 
commitment ofall signatory states to use Convention procedures 
does not bestow added power upon receiving states to control 
the course of evidence gathering or production for foreign litiga-
tion} 15 Were there no Convention at all, foreign states would 
have absolute control over evidence-gathering activities within 
their borders, and the production aspect of discovery would. 
remain entirely within the control of the forum court. 116 
The only sovereignty which the Convention compromises is 
that of the civil law signatories as states receiving letters of 
request, who agreed to modify their law and practices.117 Article 
23 simply permits these countries to limit the extent to which 
they will compromise their sovereignty in this fashion. 118 Even 
after the making of an Article 23 reservation, civil law states have 
made a substantial sacrifice in agreeing to comply with discovery 
requests from U.S. courts. This concession is certainly adequate 
consideration for the United States' reciprocal promise simply to 
make such discovery requests on behalf of parties to litigation. 
Moreover, as Justice Blackmun pointed out, the meaning of the 
term "pre-trial discovery'' in Article 23 differs from the meaning 
in American courts. 119 The civil law countries did not hope to 
112. Evidence Convention, supra note I, art. 23, 23 U.S.T. at 2568, T.I.A.S. No. 744. 
113. I 07 S. Ct . . at 2551-52. 
114. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
115. See 107 S. Ct. at 2553 ("An interpretation of the Hague Convention as the 
exclusive means for obtaining evidence located abroad would effectively subject every 
American court hearing a case involving a national of a contracting State to the internal 
laws of that State."). 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8. 
117. See .rupra note 69 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra note 39. 
119. 107 S. Ct. at 2565-66 n.21 (Blackmun, j.. dissenting in part); see supra note 39. 
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prevent discovery after the filing of a complaint and before com-
mencement of the trial; they merely sought to prohibit "fishing 
expeditions" prior to the initiation of judicial proceedings.12o As 
noted above, many of the countries that registered Article 23 
declarations have since qualified them by stating that they will 
comply with discovery requests that are specific and that seek rel-
evant evidence.I2I 
The majority also invoked the language of Article 27 as evi-
dence that the Convention is not mandatory. 122 Article 27 states 
that the Convention shall not prevent a contracting state from 
"permitting, by internal law or practice," the performance of any 
act provided for in the Convention on "less restrictive condi-
tions," or from permitting "methods of taking evidence other 
than those provided for" in the Convention. 12S However, this 
option clearly applies only to receiving states and not to sending 
states. A provision permitting a signatory to define any proce-
dure it wished for extracting evidence from another state would 
render the rest of the Convention meaningless and constitute an 
unprecedented relinquishment of sovereign authority. 12 4 
The majority's final argument against "exclusivity" was that 
"exclusivity" would put certain U.S. litigants in a disadvanta-
geous position. First, the Court argued, because foreign parties 
would be able to obtain discovery from U.S. parties under the 
Federal Rules, while U.S. parties would have to use the Conven-
tion procedures, the former would have access to more informa-
tion than would the latter.125 Second, a foreign corporation 
would have an advantage in the United States over a U.S. com-
petitor, because a third party suing both would be able to extract 
120. Set REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 1421-23. 
121. Supra note 39. See In re Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, 1 All E.R. 716, 
720-22 ( 1985) (explaining the United Kingdom's standard of specificity as requiring that 
requested documents must be "actual" - defined as documents that definitely exist or 
did exist, and are likely to be in the respondent's possession); In re Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 784, 788 (1977) (holding 
that a document request directed to the United Kingdom should be as specific as would 
be required for a subpoena duces tecum). 
122. 107 S. Ct. at 2552-53 n.24. 
123. Evidence Convention, supra note I. art. 27, 23 U .S.T. at 2569, T.I.A.S. No. 744. 
124. See 107 S. Ct. at 2559 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). See also Amram, 
United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J. 
hrr'L L. 104, I 07 (1973) ("If the domestic law of the requested state is more beneficial and 
more flexible in favor of the foreign litigant than the Convention techniques, those more 
liberal rules of the domestic law will remain available to the foreign litigant and the 
requesting authority.") (emphasis added). 
125. 107 S. Ct. at 2553 n.25. 
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more information from the U.S. corporation than from the for-
eign corporation.l26 Third, one U.S. litigant suing a citizen of a 
non-signatory state would have an advantage oyer another U.S. 
litigant suing a citizen of a signatory state, because the former 
would be permitted to use the Federal Rules. 12' 
While some inequity might arise from a rule specifying that use 
of Convention procedures precludes subsequent invocation of 
the Federal Rules, no such inequity arises from simply making 
use of Convention procedures mandatory when properly 
requested. The majority failed to recognize that a rule requiring 
adherence to the Convention in the first instance would not 
diminish the authority of federal courts to correct for any unfair-
ness by limiting the discovery of either party, drawing adverse 
inferences, or allocating costs. Thus, the proper result in Aerospa-
tiale would have been to require the district court to honor the 
French defendant's petition for use of Convention procedures, to 
impose on the defendant the costs of using those procedures,128 
to subsequently issue a Rule 3 7 order for production if Conven-· 
tion methods elicited incomplete evidence, and to sanction Aer-
ospatiale for any non-compliance with that order. 129 
The "inequity" argument suffers from additional infirmities. 
The majority assumed incorrectly that the nationality of the liti-
gants triggers the Convention when, in fact, it is the situs of the 
evidence that controls. 1 so While it may be likely that more of the 
evidence in the control of a foreign party is in a foreign state than 
is the evidence in the control of a party who is a U.S. citizen, this 
126. Jd; 
127. /d. 
128. These costs might include fees paid to translators, experts, interpreters, and 
other costs paid in connection with the procurement of evidence under the Convention. 
See Evidence Convention, supra note I, arts. 4, 14, 26, 23 U.S.T. at 2559-60, 2563-64, 
2569, T.I.A.S. No. 744. Costs may also include the loss experienced by a requested 
party because of any incremental delay created by the use of Convention procedures. 
See FEn. R. C1v. P. 37(a)(4). 
129. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b)(2). The court should limit these sanctions to redressing 
the actual harm caused by non-compliance. For example, the district court should draw 
adverse inferences only as to the specific issues left unresolved, and impose only actual 
costs incurred by the requesting party in securing the evidence by other means. Su 
Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commercialles, S.A. v. Rog-
ers, 357 U.S. 197, 213 (1958). After it has been established that failure to comply has 
been due to legal inability, the good or bad faith ofthe party should be irrelevant. Puni-
tive sanctions are unnecessary to encourage compliance, and would further no due pro-
cess objective. At the same time, good faith efforts do not diminish the strength of the 
argument that any party acting in the United States assumes the risks attendant upon 
such conduct, including the possibility of U.S.-style litigation. See supra note 81. 
130. 107 S. Ct. at 2567 (Biackmun, J., dissenting in part). 
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is not necessarily so. 131 Perhaps the most important defect in the 
majority opinion, as Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, is that 
it "completely ignores the very purpose of the Convention ... to 
facilitate discovery, not to hamper litigants." 132 Having advance 
knowledge that foreign states would accommodate their discov-
ery requests under the Convention, litigants in the United States 
would be in a much better position than they were prior to the 
Convention when they could not be certain that even a letter 
from the court would yield the desired evidence. 
After dismissing the notion of exclusivity, the majority directly 
addressed the possibility that the Convention requires requesting 
parties to resort to its procedures before "initiating any discovery 
pursuant to the normal methods of the Federal Rules."Iss The 
way the Court posed the question is another indication of its mis-
understanding of what the Convention adds to a no-Convention 
world. As noted above, 134 the Convention procedures would 
exhaust the "normal methods" available under the Federal Rules 
for obtaining evidence in such a case. The majority's answer to 
the question is germane nonetheless. It consists of an objection 
to the supposed additional expense which Convention proce-
dures entail,135 coupled with the contention that international 
comity precludes the establishment of such a uniform rule of 
"first use". u 6 
Justice Stevens alleged that letters of request are time-consum-
ing and expensive, and claimed that direct use of the Federal 
Rules is more certain to produce needed evidenceYH Once 
again, the opinion betrays a failure to comprehend that the only 
means available under the Federal Rules for extracting evidence 
from a country which prohibits parties to U.S. litigation from 
gathering evidence within its borders is a letter of request. 138 
131. See supra note 9 (noting that the Convention would apply to the taking of evi-
dence from the foreign branch or subsidiary of a U.S. corporation as well as from U.S. 
citizens abroad). 
132. 107 S. Ct. at 2567 (emphasis in the original). 
133. /d. at 2554. 
134. Set supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
135. 107 S. Ct. at 2555. 
136. Id. 
137. /d. 
138. FED. R. C1v. P. 28(b). While this same rule authorizes the taking of depositions 
abroad by a person commissioned by a court, a U.S. court has no power to order this 
method where the foreign state objects to it as an intrusion on its judicial sovereignty. 
See id. advisory committee's note. Cf United States v. Paraffin Wax, 2255 Bags. 23 
F.R.D. 289, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (noting that a commission was inappropriate because 
the requested state would only permit letters rogatory). 
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The Convention incorporates this method and adds less formal 
procedures, 139 thereby facilitating discovery which is less expen-
sive and more useful than discovery under the Federal Rules, and 
making it easier for the United States to live up to its treaty obli-
gations.140 Regular employment of Convention procedures 
would make their use increasingly more efficient, and obviate the 
majority's concerns as to cost. 
Finally, the majority held that "the concept of international 
comity requires in this context a more particularized analysis of 
the respective interests of the foreign nation and the requesting 
nation than petitioners' proposed general rule would gener-
ate."141 This conclusion must derive from the Court's earlier 
arguments relating to potential inequities - its belief that 
mandatory use of the Convention procedures would prejudice 
U.S. citizens.l42 Under the Court's theory, a general rule requir-
ing use of the Convention would always be more satisfactory to 
foreign states than it would to U.S. litigants. Therefore, although 
courts typically engage in a comity analysis to ensure proper con-
sideration of foreign state interests and those of the international 
legal community,t4s the only conceivable goal of requiring a 
time-consuming and potentially expensive comity analysis at this 
juncture would be to enable district courts to correct any seem-
ing unfairness to U.S. citizens. This article has already addressed 
the weaknesses in the inequity argument. 144 A comity analysis is 
inappropriate in Convention cases for additional reasons as well. 
A comity analysis in individual cases may be appropriate when 
there is no general rule and when a true conflict of laws exists. 14s 
However, as explained above,146 there is no legal conflict 
between the Federal Rules and foreign blocking laws as each is 
139. See Evidence Convention, supra note I, ch. II, 23 U.S.T. at 2564-68, T.l.A.S. No. 
744 (providing for the taking of evidence by diplomatic officers, consular agents and 
commissioners). 
140. The Court acknowledged that in some instances, use of the Convention would 
be the more fruitful avenue of discovery, 107 S. Ct. at 2555 n.26, but it did not offer 
examples of appropriate circumstances. 
141. /d. at 2555 (footnotes omitted). 
142. Set supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. 
143. See Pierburg GmbH v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 243-44, 186 Cal. 
Rptr. 876, 880 (1982) (citations omitted) . 
144. Set supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. 
145. Set 107 S. Ct. at 2561-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part); RESTATEMENT Of 
FoREIGN RELATIONS LAw Of THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 437(l)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 
7), supra note 94, comment a and reporter's note 2, § 473 (Tent. Draft No.6), supra note 
94. reporter's note 6. 
I 46. Set supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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properly understood and applied. Each pertains only to activity 
within the respective state's territory. The only conflict is the 
practical one experienced by the producing party who is unable 
to satisfy the law of both countries. The Evidence Convention 
supplies a general rule to resolve this situation. In negotiating 
and drafting the treaty, officials and experts from various sover-
eign states considered the factors that are relevant to a comity 
analysis, and represented the sovereign interests of the signatory 
states better than individual litigants possibly could in the hun-
dreds of cases to be brought in U.S. district courts. 147 The Con-
vention represents a compromise of those sovereign interests 
and the interests of each state's citizens. 
The majority imputes to district court judges a knowledge of 
the laws, policies, and interests of foreign governments. Justice 
Blackmun recognized that this confidence is unfounded, and con-
cluded that courts are ill-equipped to balance the interests of for-
eign nations with those of their own. 148 Justice Blackmun further 
suggested that district court judges are inexperienced in the area 
of transnational litigation and unfamiliar with the procedures of 
foreign legal systems. Consequently, they are likely to be biased 
in favor of U.S. procedures and against foreign litigants.l49 
Thus, the inevitable result of the individualized comity analysis 
which the Aerospatiale decision requires will be inconsistent, inac-
curate, and inequitable decisions at the trial court level15° - an 
outcome inimical to the interests of all nations and all private 
actors in international markets. 
Justice Blackmun's principal criticism of the majority opinion 
was that it provides insufficient guidance to district courts faced 
with international discovery disputes.l 51 However, the dissent 
stopped short of finding a " first use" requirement in U.S. law 
147. See 107 S. Ct. at 2561-62 (Blackmun,J., dissenting in part); Maier, Extraterritorial 
Discovery: Cooperation. Coercion and the Hagru Evidence Convention , 19 VAND.j. TRANSNAT'L L. 
239, 255 (1986) ("[T]he best evidence of an effective balancing of competing national 
interests is the content of an international agreement .. . not ajudicial opinion reflecting 
the unilateral speculation of a court."). 
148. 107 S. Ct. at 2560 (Biackmun,J., dissenting in part) (quoting Container Corp. v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983), in which the Supreme Court itself stated 
that it has "little competence in determining precisely when foreign nations will be 
offended by particular acts") (other citations omitted) . 
149. /d. 
150. See A. NEALE & M. STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 94-98; infra notes 155-87 and 
accompanying text. 
151. "The majority fails to offer guidance in this endeavor, and thus it has missed its 
opportunity to provide predictable and effective procedures for international litigation 
in United States courts." 107 S. Ct. at 2568 (Biackmun, J.. dissenting in part). 
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because it believed that a comity analysis might be required when 
the foreign state has made an Article 23 reservation, or when 
resort to the Convention would be futile. 152 At the same time, 
Justice Blackmun admitted that concerns about Article 23 may be 
unjustified and that it may be impossible to tell if resort to the 
Convention procedures would be futile until a court actually 
tried them.155 It should take little time to learn whether a foreign 
state will reject outright a request pursuant to the Convention, 
and courts can thereafter tailor their letters of request to satisfy 
the foreign state or, if the foreign state indicated that no request 
would satisfy it, immediately issue a Rule 3 7 order for produc-
tion. Thus, although Justice Blackmun advocated only "a gen-
eral presumption favoring use of the Convention,"154 his 
reasoning should lead to the conclusion that U.S. law requires 
courts to use the Convention whenever requested. 
VII. PosT-AEROSPATIALE CAsEs 
Justice Blackmun's predictions of future unsatisfactory district 
court decisions155 have quickly become reality. Lower court 
opinions following Aerospatiale have been parochial in their analy-
sis, inconsistent in their conclusions, and given to unsubstanti-
ated generalizations.l56 The opinions demonstrate the defects of 
the case-by-case comity analysis which the Aerospatiale majority 
mandated. 
A. Applying the Blackmun Analysis 
Only one post-Aerospatiale court to date has required use of 
Convention procedures. In Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter, 151 a case 
involving discovery of evidence located in West Germany, the 
district court noted Justice Stevens' explicit failure to offer gui-
dance158 and so applied the three-part analysis which Justice 
Blackmun offered. Justice Blackmun proposed that courts bal-
ance "the foreign interests, the interests of the United States, and 
the mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning 
international legal regime," but recognize that, in most cases, the 
152. !d. at 2567 (Biackmun, J., dissenting in part). 
15:i. !d. 
154. /d. at 2558 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). 
155. Su id. at 2558, 2559 (Biackmun, J., dissenting in part). 
156. Su infra notes 171, 172, 17 5, 178-18:i and accompanying text. 
157. 117 F.R.D. 22 (N.D.N.Y. 1987). 
158. /d. at 36. 
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Convention has already "accommodated all three categories of 
interests." 159 The Hudson court concluded under this framework 
that it was appropriate to grant the request of a foreign party that 
it use the Convention procedures. 160 
The Hudson court's assessment of the foreign sovereign's inter-
ests was consistent with our common sense interpretation of the 
Evidence Convention. West Germany's constitution contains a 
"principle of proportionality" that necessarily subjects the scope 
of discovery to judicial control. Therefore, the gathering of evi-
dence by private parties on West German soil would constitute 
"nothing less than a violation of West Germany's internal laws by 
outsiders with the approval and support of American courts." 161 
The court concluded that the requesting party and the American 
courts could avoid this affront by acting in accordance with the 
Convention. Because West Germany is a signatory to the Evi-
dence Convention, 162 the terms of the treaty are essentially a 
manifestation of the extent to which West Germany is willing to 
compromise its sovereign interests.16S 
After determining that the interests of the foreign sovereign 
dictated use o(the Convention, the court found that such compli-
ance would not jeopardize the interests of the United States in 
achieving effective discovery procedures, just resolution of dis-
putes, and accountability of foreign entities conducting business 
in the States.l64 There was no certainty that West Germany 
would deny any requests, 165 and the court had the power under 
the Federal Rules to compel discovery from, and limit discovery 
for, the foreign party should the Convention procedures prove 
inadequate .166 
Finally, the court noted the interests of the international legal 
community in the use of procedures that are both effective and 
non-violative of another sovereign's laws. The court stated that 
such accommodation would have a positive effect on interna-
tional cooperation, promote " 'predictability and stability 
159. Aerospatiak, 107 S. Ct. at 2562 (Biackmun, J., dissenting in part) (footnote 
omitted). 
160. 117 F.R.D. at 40. 
161. /d. at 38. 
162. 8 MARTINDALE-HuBBELL LAw DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 15, 17-18 (1988). 
163. 117 F.R.D. at 38. 
164. Jd. at 38-39. 
165. See id. at 39 (citation omitted) (noting that West Germany was considering new 
regulations to permit pre-trial production of" 'specified and relevant documents' "). 
166. /d. 
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through satisfaction of mutual expectation,' " and encourage 
international commercial activity .167 
Among post-Aerospatiale cases, the Hudson court stands alone in 
concluding from an independent comity analysis that it must 
employ the Evidence Convention in the first instance to obtain 
evidence located abroad. 168 A review of cases in which courts 
have concluded that they should not use Convention procedures 
demonstrates the inadequacy of the Aerospatiale approach. 
B. Applying The Analysis of the Aerospatiale Majority 
The courts following Aerospatiale that have ruled that Conven-
tion procedures were inapplicable have expressed due concern 
for the interests of foreign states and the purposes of the Con-
vention.169 However, the rulings and rationale of their decisions 
reveal that this professed deference is mere lip service. 
In applying the Aerospatiale rule, the lower courts have gone 
even further than the Supreme Court in narrowing the range of 
situations in which they will employ Evidence Convention proce-
dures. This has been accomplished by imposing on the party 
invoking the Convention the burden of proving that use of Con-
vention procedures is appropriate. 170 This rule creates a pre-
sumption against compliance with the Convention, and amounts 
to an abdication of the courts' own authority to require adher-
ence to its procedures. 
In considering whether parties have met their burden of proof, 
167. /d. at 39-40 (quoting Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 
F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
168. Some ofthe later district court opinions criticize Hudson for being too reliant on 
Justice Blackmun's analysis and not attentive enough to the narrower considerations put 
forth by the majority- namely, the need to decide cases on an individual basis by focus-
ing on the particular facts and the likely effectiveness of Convention procedures. See 
Haynes v. Kleinwefers and Lembo Corp., 119 F.R.D. 335, 338 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Ben-
ton Graphics v. Uddeho1m Corp. , 118 F.R.D. 386, 389 n.2 (D.N.J. 1987). 
169. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 838 F.2d 1362, 1365 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[I)t would 
be a serious mistake for the district court not to respect properly [sensitive interests of a 
sovereign power]."); Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 388 ("Due respect must be accorded 
special problems encountered by a foreign litigant because of its nationality, location or 
any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state.") . 
170. Rich v. KIS California, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 257-58 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (the pro-
ponent of using the Evidence Convention must prove that the discovery requests are 
intrusive, that the requests implicate important interests of a foreign sovereign, and that 
use of the Convention would be effective); Haynes , 119 F.R.D. at 341; Benton Graphics, 
118 F.R.D. at 388-89. Contra, Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter, 117 F.R.D. at 38 ("[T)he 
burden should be placed on the party opposing the use of Convention procedures to 
demonstrate that those procedures would frustrate [the United State's) interests."). 
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these courts have summarily rejected evidence of foreign state 
interests that would support the use of Convention procedures. 
For example, one court confronted with the French blocking stat-
ute concluded that it did not "warrant much deference" because 
it was "overly broad and vague."171 Similarly, another court dis-
missed as "too general" a letter from the Swedish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs reciting that country's interests in use of the Con-
vention.172 This latter court's complaint illustrates a critical flaw 
in the Aerospatiale case-by-case analysis. The court found the 
asserted interests of Sweden to be uncompelling because the 
government's letter failed to relate "specific sovereign interests" 
to the "specific discovery sought."173 The authors submit that the 
interests of any one nation will rarely vary with the particular dis-
covery demands in individual cases. To require district courts to 
analyze- and foreign parties and their governments to defend-· 
sovereign interests in every case is truly "duplicative analysis for 
which courts are not well designed."174 
Finally, the various lower court opinions rejecting use of Con-
vention procedures are circular and nonsensical. First, in an 
echo of the pre-Aerospatiale cases that refused to order compli-
ance with the treaty, the courts continue to speculate about the 
time, expense, and difficulty involved in Convention procedures 
without having actually tried to use them to see if they are indeed 
more unwieldy. 175 Moreover, they offer conflicting and con-
dusory statements that fail to accord any continued vitality to the 
Convention. 176 
One source of confusion appears to be justice Stevens' sugges-
tion that only the more burdensome discovery requests need 
conform to the Convention.l 77 For example, the court in Haynes 
v. Kleinwefers and Lembo Corp. concluded that since the discovery 
requests at issue were relatively narrow, there was no need to risk 
using Convention procedures to obtain evidence from a state 
that has made an Article 23 reservation. 178 However, the court 
171. Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 258. 
172. Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 391. 
173. /d. (emphasis in original). 
174. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2559 (Biackmun,J., dissenting in part). 
175. See Haynes v. Kleinwefers and Lembo Corp., 119 F.R.D. 335, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 
1988) (concluding that discovery pursuant to the Convention from the Federal Republic 
of Germany would be "of necessity more costly and time consuming" and possibly 
incomplete). 
176. See infra notes 178-183 and accompanying text. 
177. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557. 
178. 119 F.R.D. at 339. See also Rich v. KIS California, Inc. 121 F.R.D. 254, 258 
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failed to acknowledge West Germany's record of accommodating 
specific discovery requests notwithstanding its reservation. 179 
There was simply no reason to believe that Germany would fail 
to execute the "circumscribed" requests at issue. Conversely, 
the court in Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp. acknowledged that 
discovery would be extensive, but still held the Convention inap-
plicable because the discovery was vital to the plaintiff's case.l80 
The courts have also manifested confusion about how to weigh 
fo~eign int~rests and incompatible sovereign demands in decid-
ing whether to use the treaty procedures. For example, after not-
ing that Sweden had expressed a direct interest in the 
forthcoming discovery, the Benton Graphics court still held that the 
Convention was unnecessary because the defendants failed to 
identify any "special problem" which responding to the plain-
tiff's discovery requests would entail. 181 One would think that a 
blocking statute presents such a "special problem." Yet, the Rich 
v. KIS California, Inc. court held that employment of Convention 
procedures was unnecessary for discovery to occur in France· 
because the requests at issue did not impinge on any "impor-
tant" sovereign interests. 182 The court ignored France's explicit 
statutory prohibition against the production of evidence for liti-
gation abroad when not requested in accordance with the Evi-
dence Convention. ass 
These cases suggest that courts will invoke the Convention 
only when discovery is abusive,184 the evidence will not be dis-
positive of the major issues,185 the foreign sovereign has a partic-
ularized complaint about the requests and expresses an interest 
that the district court is willing to respect, 186 and there is no risk 
that the foreign government will refuse to comply in fun.as7 
Neither the language of the treaty nor the expressed intentions 
(M.D.N.C. 1988) (holding that use of the Convention procedures was unnecessary 
because the discovery was not abusive). 
179. See Brief for the Federal Republic of Gennany as Amicus Curiae at 8-10, Aerospa-
tiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695). 
180. 118 F.R.D. at 391. The court declined to use the Convention even after 
aclrnowledging that virtually all the requested evidence and witnesses were located in 
Sweden. /d. 
181. /d. 
182. 121 F.R.D. at 258. 
183. /d. See supra note 87 (providing text of French blocking statute). 
184. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text. 
187. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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of the signatory nations support this interpretation. Yet, the 
Supreme Court in Aerospatiale failed to set forth principles that 
would temper this unprincipled exercise of district court discre-
tion. Consequently, the progeny of Aerospatiale threaten to 
render the Evidence Convention an ineffectual relic. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's explicit rejection of both the "exclusiv-
ity" and "mandatory" positions which some lower courts had 
adopted prior to Aerospatiale operates as a significant constraint 
on future decisions. The Aerospatiale decision will preclude trial 
courts from honoring proper requests for the use of Convention 
procedures unless the courts are able to discern that the 
Supreme Court's premises were erroneous - i.e. unless they 
realize, after arriving at a common sense understanding of the 
Convention, that the interests of the parties and sovereign states 
concerned always counsel in favor of its use. To date, such an 
understanding has eluded the courts. Consequently, parties to 
transnational litigation continue to suffer the burdens and frus-
trations of thwarted foreign discovery. Thus, the great promise 
of the Evidence Convention remains unfulfilled. 
The Supreme Court has squandered an opportunity to infuse 
much needed efficiency into the process of international discov-
ery by its failure to appreciate the bounds which international law 
places on the powers of United States courts and foreign sover-
. eigns, and to interpret the Convention in clear contractual terms. 
The parochial and arbitrary decisions that follow Aerospatiale are 
likely to heighten objections from foreign states regarding U.S. 
treatment of foreign nationals. These states may, as a conse-
quence, become unwilling to continue to honor their own obliga-
tion under the Convention to execute discovery requests from 
U.S. courts. 188 
In the wake of Aerospatiale, hope for a regime of fair and effi-
cient discovery rules appears to reside in the possibility that sig-
natory nations will renegotiate the Convention to make its 
mandatory nature more explicit, or that Congress will enact a 
federal statute directing U.S. courts to use Convention proce-
dures whenever requested. Such a statute would foster stability 
and predictability in transnational litigation and would enable 
actors involved in international commerce to order their affairs 
188. See Oxman, supra note 80, at 769. 
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more rationally. Foreign companies would be better able to mea-
sure accurately the costs of doing business in the United States, 
and to allocate those costs in a more efficient manner by private 
contract.189 Greater certainty concerning discovery procedures 
would likely reduce the number ·of pre-trial evidentiary disputes. 
When litigation arises, a statute mandating use of the Convention 
would induce parties to make the most effective use of the 
treaty's procedures: The powers U.S. courts retain under the 
Federal Rules to sanction non-production would encourage pro-
ducing parties to cooperate with discovery requests, and the 
knowledge that the Convention procedures are likely to yield 
more ·complete discovery, and therefore, a more accurate and 
just result, would prompt requesting parties to _conform their dis-
covery to its terms. Finally, requiring courts to use Convention 
procedures would foster more reasonable treatment of foreign 
litigants and greater cooperation with foreign states. The result-
ing improvement in international relations would engender a 
more hospitable climate for persons living, travelling, and trans-· 
acting business outside their home state - the as yet unrealized 
hope of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
189. Su Scherk. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-18 (1974) (noting the prac-
tical need in international business contracts to resolve imminent uncertainties in 
advance). 
